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BOOK REVIEWS 343 
Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society, by Merold Westphal. Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987. Pp. xii and 129. $19.95. 
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Wheaton College. 
This book collects seven essays, all but one previously published, spanning a 
period of more than fourteen years. The title accurately indicates the contents of the 
volume, which displays a remarkable consistency of focus and interpretation. 
The book is an overwhelming and to my mind definitive correction of two basic 
and widely committed mistakes in the interpretation of Kierkegaard. The one is that 
Kierkegaard's "individualism" ignores the fact that human existence is fundamen-
tally social; the other is that Kierkegaard disvalues correct thinking ("Reason"). In 
each case Westphal corrects the misreading by seeing Kierkegaard as a social critic 
(a practitioner of "prophetic philosophy of religion" [chapters I & 2], more specifi-
cally "ideology critique" [chapter 7]) and clarifying the nature of his criticism. 
Kierkegaard's individualism, like Hegel's, is "dialectical": each individual is 
both a member (of a family, a language community, a country) and an independent 
self, and these identities are interdependent. A person cannot be an individual 
without being a member, and a person cannot be a proper and mature member of a 
proper and mature society unless he is an individual (p. 47). But Kierkegaard thinks 
Hegel to be soft on the latter half of this dialectic so that an individual's entire iden-
tity comes to be constituted by his relationship to e.g. the state. Kierkegaard's 
project is thus "to rescue dialectical individualism . . . from a Hegelian philosophy 
that he views as insufficiently faithful to it and from a society of which Hegel's 
philosophy is an all too faithful expression" (p. 33). Because the whole dialectic 
is not stringently maintained, a society is deified, and Hegel is the theoretician in 
residence: "To a society that inarticulately and thoughtlessly takes itself to be 
divine, Hegel says, Yes, we are indeed divine, and philosophy can show how this 
is both possible and necessary" (p. 38). Kierkegaard, as a prophetic philosopher, 
uses his conceptual and rhetorical skills (see "Kierkegaard's Sociology," pp. 43-59) 
to break the individual's idolatrous relationship to the social order, or in Westphal's 
words "to un-socialize the individual in order to un-deify society" (p. 34, his italics). 
On the subject of "Reason" (chapters 6 and 7), it is according to Westphal 
Kierkegaard's premise that this honorific term is often deviously used to sell a bill 
of goods. If there is any such thing as reason in general, it is something pretty thin 
like the disposition or obligation to eschew propositions of the form 'p & -po ' On 
the other hand, propositions like the following are sometimes rather insistently 
commended as dictates of Reason: 
*The Son of God cannot have been exclusively identical with any particular 
historical human individual. 
* Anything that can be known can be known without aid of divine revelation. 
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*You must never believe any historical proposition unless you have a cer-
tain amount of the kind of evidence for it that history professors traffic in. 
*Being born in Christendom is a sufficient condition for being a Christian. 
*Miracles do not occur. 
*Being generous out of your abundance is a virtue, but it's crazy to abandon 
your capital to identify with the poor. 
*Faith is for the unsophisticated; knowledge is what the sophisticated seek. 
*It is crazy to insist on the fine points of your integrity when doing so will 
cost you your life. 
When such propositions are taken to express Reason, a person may reasonably 
opt to reject it and choose instead the paradox, the absurd, the divine madness, 
the logic of insanity. Indeed, if Kierkegaard is correct, the rejection of Reason 
is a necessary condition of becoming a Christian. None of this implies that 
Kierkegaard embraces inconsistent or sloppy thinking or that he has rejected 
logic. Indeed, it is in part because he is such a sharp and consistent thinker that 
he notices how fundamentally important it is to reject Reason. 
Westphal is thoroughly acquainted with the relation of Kierkegaard's writings 
to German idealism (see especially "Abraham and Hegel," pp. 61-84), as well 
as with our European contemporaries who reflect, in one way or another, the 
influence of Kierkegaard. As a reader of only amateur acquaintance with these 
traditions, I found his jargon-free sidetrips into their thought, and the comparison 
of this with Kierkegaard's, interesting and illuminating. I recommend the book 
highly, both to Kierkegaard specialists and to others interested in rationality, 
human nature, and society. I plan to have it on the reserve shelf the next time 
I teach a course in Kierkegaard. 
